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ARGUMENT 
Appellants have met all the elements of boundary by acquiescence and the trial 
court was in error in not granting summary judgment to the Appellants on this issue. 
Appellees attempts to reframe the issues and cloud the argument cannot change the fact 
that there is mutual acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary line from at least 1986-
2007. The trial court further erred in not finding that boundary by estoppel also existed in 
this case as a completely separate and alternate theory to boundary by acquiescence. 
I. BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED 
AND THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE EXISTING FENCE 
LINE IS THE NEW BOUNDARY LINE 
In Appellees brief, they argue that there is no dispute that Appellants have failed to 
meet the twenty year requirement to establish boundary by acquiescence. That is in error. 
Appellees try to impose a 20-year ownership requirement in Utah law for a finding of 
boundary by acquiescence where none exists by making statements such as 
"[disregarding for a moment the fact that the Appellants have not owned their properties 
for the requisite 20 years." This is a misreading of Utah law. Utah law does not require 
that a single owner own the same property for twenty-years, only that mutual 
acquiescence be established for a period of twenty years. 
Mutual acquiescence has been shown for a period of at least twenty years through 
testimony of the Lauders, the Fergusons, Stephen Clark, the Lauders' predecessor, and 
Shiraki, an adjoining neighbor to both the Martins' property and the Lauders' property for 
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over thirty years who also witnessed the actions of the Eskelsons with respect to the 
disputed property. Appellants claim there was no evidence presented regarding the 
Ferguson property and the prior owner. However, it was argued before the trial court that 
while there was no evidence regarding the developer who owned the property prior to the 
Fergusons as he is deceased, if Eskelson acquiesced in part of the fence as the boundary, 
he acquiesced in the entire fence. 
Appellees argue that the evidence regarding the Lauders' predecessor is 
inadequate. Appellees continually try to attach untoward motives to the Lauders' use of 
Clark's testimony to establish the requisite twenty years of mutual acquiescence using 
language such as "scrambled to try augmenting their years", "untimely affidavit", and 
"previously undisclosed witness." The fact remains that the Lauders did not have Clark's 
testimony until after the initial summary judgment brief was filed. The Lauders had no 
reason not to disclose this witness, as he only supports the case and serves to establish the 
acquiescence for the period of 1986-1991 when the Lauders purchased the property from 
Clark. The Lauders located Stephen Clark and his current information through a search 
of the deeded records as Appellees could also have easily done through a search of the 
title records. 
Clark's affidavit was allowed to stand and the Appellees were allowed to depose 
this witness. How and when Clark was located is immaterial and does not change the fact 
that his testimony establishes that there was mutual acquiescence in the fence from at 
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least 1986-2007. Appellees conclude that acquiescence cannot be established in this case, 
regardless of testimony to the contrary, simply because the portions to the north of the 
fence line were undeveloped lots prior to 1991 and 1994. However, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated in a similar case wherein acquiescence was established when one of the 
properties in dispute was an undeveloped lot that occupancy to show acquiescence can be 
established by demonstrating that an owner came on the property "at reasonable intervals 
. . . as to have knowledge of the physical facts." Harding v. Allen, 353 P.2d 911,914 
(Utah 1960). Clark's affidavit and subsequent deposition show clearly that he came on 
his land many times and was aware of the physical facts of his land, certainly enough to 
fulfill the requirements for occupancy set forth by the court in Harding. 
Appellees attempt to further cloud the issue by arguing that Clark was unable to 
recall or explain the period of time between his ownership and that of Designer Homes, 
Inc., or between Designer Homes ownership and that of the Lauders. As explained on 
numerous occasions, Clark had absolutely no dealings with Designer Homes and would 
therefore have no recollection of such. The Lauders found Clark in 1991, negotiated the 
sale of the lot with him personally, and personally gave him the check for the property. 
Designer Homes was the developer whom the Lauders used to build the home after they 
found and purchased the lot from Clark. The deed may have been temporarily in the 
name of Designer Homes during the period of construction as the money for the lot was 
included in the construction loan, but it was the Lauders who were purchasing the 
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property from Clark and were present during all phases of the construction from 1991-
1992. 
Appellees have a complete misunderstanding of the law regarding a disruption in 
the twenty-year period and are in error on this point of law, as was the trial court. The 
Utah Supreme Court has established that the twenty-year clock can be restarted only if the 
joint properties are commonly owned, or are ever state-owned, regardless of how brief the 
common ownership or state ownership is. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 
(Utah 1998). These are not the facts at issue here and Appellees do not even claim such. 
There was no brief disruption in this case sufficient to restart the clock and to argue that 
there was a disruption is an incorrect interpretation of Utah law. 
As explained, while the deed to the Lauder property may have been temporarily in 
the name of Designer Homes, it was on behalf of the Lauders who were under contract 
with Designer Homes to build the home on the property. There was no common 
ownership on the disputed properties and there was no state ownership. There was 
therefore no disruption in the twenty-year clock and boundary by acquiescence has been 
established from at least the period of 1986-2007. 
Appellees next argue that Appellants failed to show acquiescence on the Martins' 
side of the fence. To the contrary, evidence establishes acquiescence by the Martins' 
predecessors, the Eskelsons, for the requisite twenty-years through silence and inaction, 
as well as overt statements and actions. This court recently decided a boundary by 
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acquiescence case in Smith v. Security Investment LTD, 2009 UT App 355, 644 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 13, that outlines a number of issues which are on point with this case. As to 
acquiescence by silence, this court outlined the requirements of boundary by acquiescence 
in Smith and reaffirmed that mutual acquiescence can be established by silence. The court 
stated that acquiescence is a "highly fact-dependant" matter and "[furthermore, in this 
case, the fact that the fence appeared to be a boundary is something in addition to pure 
silence," and Utah law "supports the proposition that silence or lack of objection to an 
adjoining landowner's use of a disputed parcel of land are facts that impliedly show 
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary." Id. at footnote 3 citing Brown v. Jorgensen, 
2006 UT App 168; Ault v. Holden. 2002 UT 33; and Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119 
(1973). 
Similarly in this case, the fence between the Lauder/Ferguson properties and the 
Martin property stood for over thirty years and is in line with the fences at the east and 
west corners of the boundary. The fence line only deviates from the surveyed property 
line as little as eighteen inches at the minimum to 3.8 feet at the maximum. In all 
respects, this fence appeared to be the boundary between the two properties and all parties 
treated it as such. Therefore, the fact that the Eskelsons remained silent when 
improvements were being made up to the fence line, failed to object when debris was 
removed from the disputed area (including any so-called "stored construction materials" 
which were never used or reclaimed) to make way for improvements, and made overt 
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statements to Ed Lauder as discussed in the initial brief, falls within the definitions of 
acquiescence which this court has set, especially considering the placement of the fence 
in light of the language in Smith. The court states, "[w]ith the fence appearing to denote 
a boundary of the disputed parcel, Security's silence, inaction, and failure to object to the 
Smiths' use of the two acres is highly significant." in Smith v. Security Investment LTD, 
2009 UT App 355, 644 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 at f 8. Similarly, Eskelson was silent when 
improvements were made. Eskelson also did not act to prevent improvements or object to 
improvements being made and debris being removed from the disputed area. 
Not only did the Eskelsons treat the fence line as the border and therefore 
acquiesce through silence, but their actions with respect to their treatment of the disputed 
area also reflect acquiescence. Appellants continue to claim that the Martin family used 
and occupied the disputed area over the fence. Testimony from Clark, the Lauders, the 
Fergusons and Shiraki, all adjoining landowners, show otherwise. Although Diane 
Martin never lived in the home or was a property owner until 2007, she was allowed to 
testify in her affidavit that "her family" somehow maintained the area. She never 
provides dates, however, for when any of this maintenance occurred and argues that 
Appellants did not and cannot refute this testimony as they were not landowners at the 
time and thus had no personal knowledge. 
This same argument can be made in relation to the testimony of Diane Martin and 
her brother Darrell. Diane was never a landowner until after the relevant acquiescence 
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period and never lived in the home at all during the relevant period. Her brother Darrell 
moved out of the home long before the relevant period, yet they profess to have personal 
knowledge as to their parents actions with respect to the disputed area. If there was some 
maintenance which occurred, even though it seems impossible where there appeared to be 
no easy way to access the area, and evidence from Shiraki, also an adjoining landowner 
since the 1970's shows otherwise, Diane Martin never provides dates when this may have 
occurred and it is clear that this maintenance did not occur from at least 1986-2007. 
Additionally, on the one hand Appellees claim that the slope of the land was too 
great to put a fence on the correct property line, yet somehow they were able to store 
construction materials and plant grapevines on this slope. These two propositions are 
contrary to one another. If the slope was too great to support a fence, it was too great to 
store any materials. 
Appellees take issue with Appellants stating the fact that there was no gate in the 
fence. Although the word "gate" may not have been used in the trial court, the fact 
remains, there was no gate in the fence, and thus no apparent way to access the disputed 
area without climbing the chain-link fence. Photographs from the time show and all of 
the adjoining landowners can state with personal knowledge that there was no gate in the 
fence and never was. In fact, Appellees own photographs and survey that were provided 
in response to Appellants discovery requests show that there was no gate in the fence. 
These photographs are attached hereto as Exhibit A. If Appellees are arguing for the first 
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time the existence of a gate where there was no gate, they have no clear recollection of 
the disputed area and her ''personal knowledge" of her family's use of the disputed area 
is flawed. 
The Smith court addressed this point of a gate stating, "[s]uch a deliberate decision 
not to cordon off the relevant portion of land - - or to put a gate in the existing fence so 
as to make some use of it - - also suggests that Security tacitly acquiesced in the fence as 
a boundary, which it appeared to be." Id- at f 9 (emphasis added). Without access to the 
disputed area, other than climbing the fence, it cannot reasonably be argued that the 
Eskelsons intended to make any use of the land and also suggests that they "tacitly 
acquiesced in the fence as a boundary, which it appeared to be." Id. 
II. THE LAUDER, FERGUSON AND SHIRAKI AFFIDAVITS SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN STRICKEN 
The trial court also erred in striking portions of the affidavits submitted by 
appellants and in not striking the Martin and Eskelson affidavits. Appellees claim that the 
Lauder and Ferguson affidavits were not based on personal knowledge. Continually 
repeating an argument does not make it true and to claim that the affidavits lacked 
personal knowledge is completely without basis. The affidavits from the Lauders, Shiraki 
and Mary Best Ferguson are all based on personal first-hand accounts which the affiants 
witnessed themselves with respect to the fence and the Martins' predecessors. The 
affidavits never purported to claim anything with respect to what the Martins did or 
thought, as our claim is that boundary by acquiescence occurred prior to their living on 
8 
the land. Nor, did the affidavits purport to claim anything with respect to what their 
predecessors knew or were thinking or feeling, as Appellees claim. The affidavits only 
discussed what the affiants witnessed in the Eskelsons' actions and in their statements to 
the Lauders and Fergusons. Testifying as to first-hand accounts which the affiants 
witnessed and conversations which they personally had with the Eskelsons constitutes 
"personal knowledge" and would be allowed as testimony. 
Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence "requires that the witness have the 
opportunity and the capacity to perceive the events in question," State v. Eldridge, 773 
p.2d 29, 33 (Utah 1989), and that an affidavit must give a witness's "firsthand knowledge 
of the events he is testifying about so as to present the most accurate information to the 
finder of fact." U.S. v. Hoffiier. 777 f.2d 1423, 1425 (10th Cir. 1985). The Lauder, 
Ferguson and Shiraki affidavits were all based on first-hand knowledge of the events and 
there was no finding by the trial court, as Appellees claim, that Appellants made 
statements based on what they heard from other parties. Appellees provide no citation to 
the record or the affidavits themselves to support these claims. While the trial court did 
strike some statements in the Lauder, Ferguson and Shiraki affidavits, there was no 
reasoning given as to why certain statements were struck and to claim or infer otherwise 
is in error. 
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III. THE FENCE LINE ALSO BECAME THE BOUNDARY LINE ON A 
THEORY OF BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL 
The trial court erred in not finding that the fence line became the boundary line on 
a theory of boundary by estoppel. Not only did the trial court fail to make a finding of 
estoppel, but it did not even make an analysis of this point. The trial court summarily 
ruled this argument as "moot" after finding that there was no boundary by acquiescence 
even though they are separate theories that have no requirement that one must follow the 
other. Again, the Appellees misunderstand this point of law. Appellees attempt to 
provide reasoning for the trial court where none exists and imply that the Appellants are 
being somehow disrespectful to the trial court to suggest that there was no analysis or 
reasoning. Appellees are not at liberty to supply reasoning by purporting to know what 
the trial court was thinking or feeling when he made his ruling. 
The Court of Appeals' recent decision in Bahr v. Imus discusses the theory of 
boundary by estoppel and provides much insight on the analysis of the law to facts that 
are similar to the instant case. Bahr v. Imus, 2009 UT App 155, 211 P.3d 987. Appellees 
argue that equitable estoppel is generally only applied where there are misrepresentations 
of past or present fact. (Citing Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, <f 15, 
158 P.3d 1088). The Bahr court, however, specifically cited Youngblood stating that there 
is "nothing in Youngblood requiring fraudulent, misleading, ( 
by the party sought to be estopped. Bahr v. Imus, at f 11. 
Appellees also argue that the Lauders and Fergusons 1 
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Martins or the Eskelsons misrepresented facts to entice them to act, and that neither had a 
legal duty to clarify the Appellants' erroneous and unexpressed assumptions. The first 
element of equitable estoppel, however, is a failure to act that is inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted. Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes. 2004 UT App 391, | 14, 101 P.3d 830. As 
discussed above, there is not a requirement of misrepresentation of facts and Appellees 
are incorrect on this point of law. 
Eskelson did fail to act, however, on a number of points. He failed to act or assert 
a claim on the disputed land when debris was being removed by the Lauders and the 
Fergusons. Eskelson failed to act or assert his rights when a perpendicular fence was 
built between the Lauder and Ferguson properties that went all the way up to the Eskelson 
fence. He failed to act or assert his rights when improvements were made in the disputed 
area including a cement patio being poured, sprinkler pipe being laid, and trees and plants 
being planted in the disputed area. And, the Eskelsons failed to act in not ever reclaiming 
or removing any "stored construction materials." As a result of these failures to act, the 
Lauders and Fergusons took reasonable actions with respect to the fence line being the 
boundary line and continued to make improvements in what is now the disputed area. 
Appellees are correct that the Lauders and Fergusons do not make any claims with 
respect to the Martins. The Martins did not make any claims on the disputed area until 
August of 2007, by which time estoppel had already been established by their 
predecessor's failure to act and Appellants reasonable reliance thereon. The actions of 
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the Lauders and Fergusons were also not based on "unexpressed assumptions" as 
Appellees claim. As discussed more fully in Appellants initial brief and above, the 
Eskelsons were present and aware when improvements were being made. Additionally, 
Mrs. Eskelson clearly stated her belief to Mr. Lauder that the fence line was the boundary 
line when she told him that he could cut any branches of the Eskelsons' trees that went 
over the fence line on to the Lauder property. Similar to the facts in Bahr, it is not 
credible that neighbors of nearly twenty years "would lack knowledge of improvements 
made along the separating boundary fence." Bahr v. Imus, at f 13. Appellees want this 
Court to adopt requirements in estoppel such as misrepresentations of fact and an ability 
to uncover the true boundary through a survey. The court in Bahr did not require either of 
these elements for a finding of equitable estoppel in the boundary dispute context. 
Appellees attempt to distinguish Bahr from the instant case by arguing that the 
parties constructed the fence together in Bahr. The fact that Eskelson built the fence on 
his own, however, slants in favor of the Lauders and Fergusons because of their complete 
lack of fault in the incorrect placement of the fence. The other facts that Appellees claim 
distinguish Bahr from this case are that both owners were uncertain of the true deeded 
line; both owners made improvements up to the finished fence, and the finished fence sat 
as a boundary for nearly 20 years. Yet in this case the Lauders and Fergusons were also 
not aware of the true deeded line, and if Eskelson was, he never stated his belief to the 
Lauders and Fergusons. Improvements were made up to the finished fence, and in this 
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case, the finished fence sat as a boundary for nearly 30 years. Finally, injury will result in 
the Lauders and Fergusons having to remove permanent structures. Thus, the elements of 
boundary by estoppel have been met. As in Bahr, when a new owner, the Martins in this 
case, objected to the fence as a boundary, this Court should find that the knowledge and 
actions of the new owner's predecessor (the Eskelsons) had already established an 
equitable estoppel claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The elements of boundary by acquiescence have been met and this court should 
find that the fence line became the boundary line between the properties. Alternatively, 
this court should find that the elements of boundary by estoppel have also been met to 
find that the fence line became the boundary line. 
Accordingly, this court should overturn the grant of Summary Judgment in favor 
of the Plaintiffs/Appellees and grant Summary Judgment in favor of the Appellants. In 
addition, the Appellants request an award of their costs on appeal and in the trial court 
and an order vacating the award of costs in the trial court to Appellees. 
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